第三种情况是公司拥有具控制权的大股东,但却不参与公司经营,这种特殊个案在现实社会中有Hershey食品与道琼公司等例子,公司能够充分运用外部董事的能力,若是董事们对于经营阶层的能力或品格感到不满意,他们可以直接向大股东反应(当然大股东可能也是董事成员),这种环境相当适合外部董事的发挥,因为他只需要将情况向单一且关心公司前景的所有权人报告,同时只要论点理由充分就可以马上发挥改变的效果,但即便如此,有意见的董事也只能有这样的选择管道,若是他对于特定事情的处理结果不满意,他还是只能辞职而别无其它选择。
Logically, the third case should be the most effective in insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over-reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds unfettered.
理论上,第三种情况最能够确保一流的经营阶层存在,因为第二种情况,老板不可能把自己给Fire掉,而第一种情况,董事们通常很难与表现平庸