首先是第一类,也是目前最普遍的一类,在公司的股权结构中,并没有一个具掌控能力的大股东,在这种情况下,我相信董事会的行为应该要像是公司有一个因事未出席的大股东一样,在各种情况下,都要能够确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利益不会受到损害,然而很不幸的是,所谓的长期利益,反而给了董事会很大的弹性操作空间,而假设董事会运作尚称顺畅,不过经营阶层却很平庸甚至差劲时,那么董事会就必须负起责任将经营阶层换掉,就好象一般公司老板会做的决定一样,另外要是经营阶层能力尚可,只不过过于贪心,不时地想要从股东的口袋里捞钱,那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告。
In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational causes.